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I n the earIy 1860s Gladstone attempted to revolutionize British wine con-
sumption by making substantial cuts to duties and creating new outlets 
for retail sale. Although imports almost tripled between the late 1850s and 
the mid-1870s, this proved not to be a permanent change in drinking 
habits, as wine consumption then declined for the rest of the century. On 
the eve ofthe First WorId War wine imports were higher than they had been 
a century earlier, but per caput annual consumption at a bottle and a half 
remained as it had been in 1815, and was half the level of the earIy 
1870s. Therefore if a combination of falling production costs and falling 
ttansport costs encouraged a major increase in the consumption of a wide 
variety of foods and beverages in nineteenth-century Britain, this happened 
only briefly with wine. Why this was the case is an important question, 
because Britain's growing, and comparatively wealthy, urban population 
might have provided an important market for producers in southem Eur-
ope. For example, if the British had consumed just one-tenth of the French 
figure in the 1890s, this would have created a demand for wine equivalent 
to 18 per cent of Spain's total output, or 14 per cent of Italy's, or 105 per 
cent of Portugal's.2 As it was, the city of Paris consumed about seven times 
as much wine as the whole of the United Kingdom.3 This failure to main-
tain export markets for products such as wine was a major cause of the low 
productivity found in agriculture in southem Europe, and contributed 
indirectly to the low living standards of the region. 
The eighteenth and earIy nineteenth centuries saw considerable inno-
vation in grape and wine production in various parts of Europe, permitting 
a number of distinctive wines, such as madeira, port, sherry, claret, and 
champagne to be marketed. Merchants in the centres of production, very 
often British or of British descent, played a key role in this process, although 
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high import duties caused wine to remain a luxury in the home market. The 
legislative changes of the ear1y 1860s, together with the more general 
changes taking place in retailing at this time, such as the wider use of 
brands, heavy advertising, high sales volumes, and low unit prices presented 
new possibilities for selling wine. This artide argues that the failure to cre-
ate a mass market for wine was caused by the interaction of two factors: 
volatility of supply and the difficulties in establishing impersonal exchange 
mechanisms in place of those based on the personal reputation of economic 
agents such as wine merchants. Because Britain was a single market sup-
plied mainly by four difIerent wine-producing regions in Europe, it is an ap-
propriate source to show why sorne commodity chains were more flexible 
than others. Contemporaries frequent1y maintained that consumers 
switched between difIerent types of wines because of changes in taste and 
fashion, but this artide will argue that the changes can be explained, at least 
in part, by the degree of success that producers and merchants had in over-
coming marketing problems. Consumers often received insufficient infor-
mation to judge the quality of a wine before buying it, and the high price 
of sorne wines encouraged cheap imitations, sorne of which were so bad 
as to be prejudicial to the health of the drinker. 
The artide is divided into six sections. The first looks at changes in wine 
consumption over the nineteenth century, and traces the fortunes of difIer-
ent types of wines. The next section considers the nature of supply volatility 
and the response by merchants. Because geography placed strict limits to 
the supply of a particular wine, sudden increases in demand or prolonged 
shortages caused by vine disease encouraged merchants to purchase wines 
from other regions. Unless consumers could easily identify product quality 
prior to purchase, there was a risk that this strategy would damage the mar-
ket once normal supplies resumed. Section III considers the response of 
producers of fortified wines (port and sherry) and section IV extends this 
investigation to French wines (daret and champagne). It is argued that 
sorne commodity chains were more successful than others in providing con-
sumers with accurate information on wine quality. Section V considers the 
problems associated with the retailing ofwines in the United Kingdom and 
investigates why, unlike sorne other imported foods and beverages in this 
period, the commodity chain remained 'production', rather than 'market', 
ledo The final section provides sorne condusions. 
1 
In early nineteenth-century Britain, wine was considered a luxury product 
and price was less important in determining demand than other factors, 
such as changes in fashion and taste. Therefore, despite a rapidly growing 
population, rising real incomes, and a reduction in import duties of about 
34 per cent, aggregate consumption increased by on1y 16 per cent between 
1799/1824 and 1825/51, and annual per caput consumption fell from 
almost three bottles at the end of the eighteenth century to half that figure 
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in the early 1850s.4 The reduction to 5s. 9d. per gallon in 1840 stillleft 
duties equivalent to the import price of 'good' sherv' twice that of 'tavem' 
sherry, and five times that of ordinary table wines. In the debate on duty 
reform in the 1850s, George Porter, the author of The progress oi nations, ar-
gued that only a major reduction in duties would increase consumption suf-
ficiently to maintain the Exchequer's revenue, 'not so much by inducing 
persons who are at present consumers of wine to take more of it, as by 
enlarging the circle into which it would be introduced'. 6 
When Gladstone brought in new legislation in the early 1860s as part of 
the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, his aim was to change radically the nature of 
wine drinking in Britain. By 1862, duties on wines with an alcoholic 
strength of under 26° proof (equivalent to 14.8° Gay-Lussac) had been 
cut from 5s. 9d. a gallon to Is., with stronger ones paying 2s. 6d.7 For for-
tified wines, such as sherry or port, this was a reduction of 57 per cent; for 
unfortified wines, the cheapest of which could now retail for under 1 s. a 
bottle, the reduction was 83 per cent. The new legislation also introduced 
major changes in the retailing of wines. This was especially true of the 
'Single Bottle Act' of 1861, which allowed retailers, on the payrnent of a 
relatively small licence fee, to sell wine for consumption 'off' their prem-
ises.8 These changes led to a rapid growth in consumption, with total wine 
imports increasing from 32.5 million litres in 1856/60 to 78 million in 
1871/5 (table 1). Sorne countries benefited more than others. Imports of 
French wines, which were rarely fortified and therefore paid the lower duty, 
grew six-fold, and market share jumped from 8 per cent in the early 1850s 
to 40 per cent by the early 1880s.9 By contrast, fortifying with alcohol was 
an integral part of the production of sherry and port, and other wines from 
the Iberian peninsula were also strengthened so that they would keep.lO 
Wine imports from Portugal grew by only two-thirds between 1856/60 
and 1871/5, and market share fell from 30 to 20 per cent. By contrast, 
Spanish imports increased one and a half times, with market share remain-
ing roughly constant at 40 per cent. 
4 Calculated from Tennent, Wine, pp. 28, 36. 
5 Dover, in S. C. on Impon Duties (P.P. 1852, XVII), p. 653. The duty was equivalent to approxi-
mately 35%, 46%, and 56% of the retail price. 
6 Porter, in ibid., pp. 498, 511. 
7 Rates changed in both 1860 and 1861. Those introduced in 1862 lasted until 1886, when the lower 
rates were extended to wines ofup to 30° proof. In 1899 the duty was increased to Is. 3d. for wines of 
less than 30°, and 3s. for those aboye that leve!. For sparkling wines an additional duty was imposed in 
1888 of 2s. 6d. per imperial gallon, or Is. 3d. if the value of the wine did not exceed 15s. This was 
reduced to 2s. irrespective ofvalue in 1893 and raised to 2s. 6d. from 1899. Finally, ordinary bottled 
wines paid an additional Is. per gallon after 1899. 
8 The licence fee was between [,2 lOs. and [,10, depending on the value ofthe premises. By 1880, 
3,895 licences had been granted to sell wine. Wine dealers, who could not sell wine in quantities of less 
than 2 gallons (12 bottles), paid [,5 5s.: Wilson, Alcohol and me nation, pp. 322-3 and tab 25. See also 
Briggs, Wine lor sale, p. 37. 
9 For example in 1875,95% ofSpanish wines and 98% ofPortuguese paid 2s. 6d. a gallon, and 96% 
of French wines paid the lower rate of Is.: S. C. on Wine Duties (P.P. 1878-9, XlV), pp. 315-17. 
10 !bid., pp. 118-19. 
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Table 1. Wines retained lor home consumption in the United Kingdom 
% 01 wines retained 
Date Total (m. litres) France Portugal Spain Others 
1816-1820 2l.85 3.8 55.2 19.2 2l.8 
1821-1825 24.71 4.5 5l.2 22.3 22.0 
1826-1830 29.72 5.4 45.6 29.6 19.4 
1831-1835 28.44 4.0 43.1 34.9 18.0 
1836-1840 30.67 5.7 41.3 36.3 16.7 
1841-1845 27.86 6.4 38.4 39.2 16.0 
1846-1850 28.74 5.8 40.9 39.0 14.3 
1851-1855 30.58 7.7 37.7 39.8 14.8 
1856-1860 32.47 10.2 29.6 39.8 20.4 
1861-1865 49.62 20.1 24.6 4l.7 l3.6 
1866-1870 65.66 27.2 20.0 4l.7 11.0 
1871-1875 77.97 29.2 20.4 39.9 10.5 
1876-1880 75.78 37.5 19.4 33.4 9.6 
1881-1885 65.81 40.3 19.5 29.7 10.6 
1886-1890 63.28 39.3 22.7 25.8 12.2 
1891-1895 65.56 38.7 23.8 23.1 14.4 
1896-1900 73.52 37.1 22.5 23.8 16.6 
1901-1905 62.28 32.7 23.3 24.6 19.4 
1906-1910 54.71 30.9 25.6 23.6 19.9 
1911-1916 49.85 24.7 29.7 25.7 19.9 
Source: Wilson, Alcohol and the narúm, tab. 12 
The leve1 of wine consumption was not maintained, however, but feH by 
30 per cent between 1871/5 and 1909/13 to just over half a million hecto-
litres on the eve of the Great War, a figure equivalent to little more than 
1 per cent of French output. Per caput consumption, which had reached 
about three bottles in 1873 and 1876, had halved by 1909/13.11 The 
decline in per caput consumption from the 1870s cannot be explained by 
a switch to other alcoholic beverages, as the movements in demand both 
for spirits and for beer were similar to that for wine (figure 1). There are 
a number of possible explanations for the faH in alcohol consumption in this 
period, including the growing supply of alternative consumer goods that 
encouraged a diversification in household expenditure, and the influence 
ofthe Temperance movement. 12 However, these arguments cannot explain 
why consumers did not switch from spirits or beer to wine. More important 
here, neither can they explain the changes in the types of wine being drunk 
over the periodo Sherry (figure 2), claret (figure 3), and champagne 
(figure 4) aH saw rapid increases in consumption at one moment or other, 
but then experienced a decline. For sherry, this decline can be dated from 
the ear1y 1870s, for quality claret from the ear1y 1880s, for ordinary claret 
11 From 0.56 to 0.26 gallons: Wilson, Alcohol and the nation, pp. 332-3. 
12 Gourvish and Wi1son, British brewing industry, ch. 2. Before 1900 the slight decline in per caput 
consumption of beer and spirits was compensated by the growth in population and exports, 1eading 
one historian to claim that, in the nineteenth century, 'temperance had promised much and de1ivered 
1inIe': Weir, 'Obsessed with moderation', p. 96. 
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Figure 1. Alcohol consumption per head, 1815-1914 
1815/24 = 100 
Source: Wilson, Alcohol and che nation, pp. 331-3 
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Figure 2. Imports 01 sheny and Spanish wine, 1850-1905 
Source: Wilson, Alcohol and the nation, pp. 362-3; Ridley's, various years 
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Figure 3. Wine exports from Bordeaux to Britain, 1825-1911 
Source: Tableau Général du Commerce 
from the late 1880s, and for champagne from about 1900. Although port 
wine avoided the sharp downtum in imports prior to the First World 
War, it also experienced fluctuations in demand over the century (figure 
5). Before looking more closely at these different wines, it is necessary to 
consider briefly the supply side, and especially the importance of vine dis-
eases in the nineteenth century. 
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Figure 4. Exports oi champagne to Britain, 1831-1911 
Source: Tableau Général du Commerce 
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Figure 5. Port wine imports to the United Kingdom, 1814-1910 
Source: Wilson, Alcohol and the nation, pp. 362-3 
II 
Wine was, and remains, a difficult product to sello Most wines were made 
from a variety of grapes, and blending of wines from different regions 
was common. 13 As noted aboye, some wines also required spirits to be 
added before shipping. Further mixing and strengthening in England was 
considered by many to be both a legitimate and a necessary part of the 
trade. 14 However, the problems of marketing in the nineteenth century 
were caused not just by the heterogeneous nature of wine, but also by sup-
ply volatility. Casson has suggested three types ofvolatility, which organiza-
tional structures have to overcome. 15 In the first instance, important 
structural changes in the market could create new opportunities to trade. 
Gladstone's fiscal and legal innovations of 1860-2 created conditions which 
significantly increased the size of the potential market for wine both by 
reducing duties and by creating new marketing channels for its sale. These 
changes, together with improvements in transport, also reduced entry costs 
for new regions to trade with the United Kingdom. A second type of vola-
tility concems the tluctuations in supply and demand within established 
markets caused, for example, by a harvest failure in Bordeaux, or a business 
13 Even quality clarets for the English market in the early nineteenth century were blended with wines 
from Hermitage or Benicarlo (Spain). 
14 The Safe Food and Drugs Act of 1875 required clear labelling of contents, but permined the mix-
ing ofwines, although not with ingredients 'injurious' to the health. The major problem appears to have 
been the addition ofpotato spirit, which contained fusel oil: S. C. onAdulteratwn of FoodAct (P.P. 1874, 
VI), p. 207. For the 1875 act, see especially French and Phillips, Cheated not poisoned? 
15 Casson, InformatÜJn and organization, pp. 10-11. 
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Figure 6. French wine prices, 1840-1913 
Sources: Pech, Emreprise viticok, pp. 511-12; Annuaire Sratistique, 1934, pp. 62-3 
depression in the manufacturing districts of northern England. Although 
the timing of these events cannot be predicted accurately, they are not 
entirely unexpected and short-term movements in prices are usually 
sufficient to balance supply with demand again. However, an additional 
problem with wine is that quality also changes with each vintage, increasing 
the problem of c1assification along the commodity chain. 
Finally, Casson suggests a third type ofvolatility, which is associated with 
'breakdowns and interruption of supply that disrupt the equilibrium flow'. 16 
In the nineteenth century there were a number of important breakdowns in 
the supply of wine, which lasted several years. These were caused by new 
diseases brought from North America, a negative consequence of the faster 
voyage times in the Atlantic economy. The first was oidium or powdery 
mildew, which both reduced harvests and wine ~uality, especially between 
1853 and 1856, and caused prices to soarbriefly.1 Phylloxera, a disease that 
in time required the replanting of virtually all of Europe's vineyards, 
followed. 18 Especially relevant here is what happened in France, where pro-
duction slumped from an average of 58 million hectolitres a year in 1871/5 
to 26 million in 1886/90, and average prices rose by one-third between the 
ear1y 1870s and the ear1y 1880s, before dec1ining once more in the face of 
massive imports and a recovery in domestic production (figure 6).19 Per 
16 Ibid., p. 1l. 
17 The solution to oidium was to dust the vines with sulphur. 
18 Although the disease was identified in France in the 1860s, many ofEurope's vineyards were not 
infected until the twentieth century. See especially Ordish, Wine blight and Pouget, Histoire de la lutte. 
19 Direction Générale, Annuaire statistique, p. 63. 
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caput consumption in Britain therefore started to decline at the same time as 
domestic supplies were falling fast in France. Although there were various 
ways of treating phylloxera, such as the frequent tlooding of vineyards or 
injecting the soil with sulphocarbonates or carbon disulphide, these were 
too expensive for most producers. The on1y effective long-term cure was to 
plant phylloxera-immune American vines, which were then grafted with Eur-
opean scions. The third disease was downy mildew whose appearance in the 
1880s not only reduced the size ofharvests, but more important1y ruined the 
quality. Once a solution was found to downy mildew (treatment with 'Bor-
deaux mixture'), the attacks from this disease and from oidium became lim-
ited to those years when growers were unable to take preventive measures. 
The wine trade in producer countries responded to these supply disrup-
tions in two different ways: by allowing the shortage of good-quality wine to 
increase prices, or by reducing quality with the use of cheaper, inferior 
wines from other regions to compensate for the sma1ler local harvests. 
For example, oidium caused the price ofhigh-quality mature sherries to tri-
ple in Britain between 1850/3 and 1860/3, but lower import duties and the 
ability of shippers to export wines from other regions as 'sherry' actually led 
to a fall in prices for the cheapest wines.20 In fact, London prices for a wide 
range of ordinary wines from Iberia stagnated over several decades, despite 
significant tluctuations in both the size and quality of the vintages, and the 
tendency for wine prices in producer countries to increase from the late 
1870s (figure 7). The same was true of cheap claret. Ridley & Co. '5 Wine 
and Spirit Trade Circular, a leading trade journal for the British market, 
noted that in Bordeaux a consequence of the significant decrease in harvest 
size caused by phylloxera was that: 
no pure Claret can now be put on board under [,8, and then of less satisfactory qual-
ity than was a few years since easily obtainable at [,5; whilst blends with Spanish Red, 
South ofFrance, and other Wines are sold, occasionally under their ttue designation, 
but generally under the usurped title of 'Claret', at from [,5 to [,7 per hhd.21 
Therefore although shippers supplied cheap wines at stable prices, the 
quality often varied considerably, making the need for consumer infor-
mation crucial, not just for the expensive 'fine' wines, but also for cheap 
wines. There are two major factors to consider when determining a wine's 
quality, namely its 'growth' and the 'vintage'. Growth can be defined as the 
natural environment of a vineyard (the terroir) and the technology and skills 
used in the production of the wine. This information could then be shown 
by using the name (brand) of the grower and/or the shipper. Adding the 
year of production (vintage) provided information on the annual changes 
in quality. Price differences for wines from vineyards found in a relative1y 
20 Shaw, Wine, p. 235; Simpson, Too little regulation? 
21 Nov. 1891, p. 627. Published under a number of slightly difIerent titles from 1848, Ridley's was 
often critical of the manipulation of wine by foreign producers, but more tolerant of the same practice 
when undertaken by British merchants: Ridley's, Jan. 1881, p. 5. A hogshead (hhd.) was equivalent to 
between 220 and 225 litres. 
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small geographical area could be significant. Thus in Bordeaux's Haut 
Médoc, red wine in a particular year could range from 300 francs per tun 
(900 litres) for apaysan growth, to 5,000 francs for the first-class growthS.22 
Of perhaps even greater importance for the wine market was the fact that 
after a good vintage, the wine of a less well-known grower might sell for 
more than the price of a top chateau after a poor one.23 
Price differences of these magnitudes created strong incentives for indi-
viduals along the commodity chain to benefit from the problems of 
incomplete information. The situation was further complicated in the 
1870s and 1880s by the general shortage of wines and by high prices. 
There was also the potential risk that a serious decline in a wine's quality, 
or consumers' concem about the widespread sale of adulterated imita-
tions, might threaten the reputation not just of the cheaper wines, but also 
of the quality ones. As Akerlof has argued, asymmetries of information 
where the buyer has insufficient knowledge of the quality of a product 
prior to purchase can lead to a situation whereby bad goods drive out 
the goOd.24 The next two sections consider how producers in some 
22 Cocks and Feret, Bordeaux et ses vins, 8th edn., p. 89. Likewise González Byass sold sherry at prices 
~ between:08 and :050 per butt (500 litres) in 1878: Montañés, González Byass, p. 264. 
2 For example wines from the leading growers (premier crus) in 1853 sold for less than some of the 
crus paysans of 1854: Markham, 1855, p. 369. 
24 Akerlof, 'Market for "lemons" '. 
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regions were more successful than others in avoiding these problems. 
Given the difficulties in achieving voluntary agreements among economic 
agents to control wine quality at the source of production, a number of 
private strategies, such as the development of brand names or the pro-
duction of 'vintage' wines were devised to provide information to consu-
mers, with varying degrees of success. 
III 
The fact that sherry and port accounted for approximately three-quarters 
of aH British imports of wine before 1860 implied that the potential new 
wine-drinking public were already aware of these names, although the 
commercial structure for their sale was that of quality wines. As fortified 
wines, they also had the advantage over unfortified wines in that they 
kept longer once the bottle was open. Total sherry exports rose from 
about 15 million litres a year in the 1850s to almost 40 million in the 
ear1y 1870s.25 However, by the ear1y 1890s the figure had fallen to less 
than 20 million litres, and imports to the United Kingdom were less 
than a quarter of what they had been at their peak (figure 2). Contem-
poraries argued that this fall was caused by a decline in the drink's 
'reputation', the result of the sale as 'sherry' of large quantities of 
poor-quality wines, some of which were prejudicial to the drinker's 
health.26 However, a similar combination of high prices and widespread 
adulteration had led to a decline in the imports of port from the 
mid-1830s to the ear1y 1850s, but these then recovered (figure 5), in 
sharp contrast to sherry. The next point to consider is the attempts by 
producers to classify their wine for consumers, and then the question 
of the supply of cheap wines and adulteration. 
Both in Jerez and in Porto, trade was dominated by a smaH number of 
shippers who sold wine under their own 'brand', thereby assuming 
responsibility for its quality. One major difference between the two drinks 
was that by the 1860s the leading merchants had perfected the production 
of vintage port, which was made only after a good harvest. This did not 
imply that high-income consumers could dispense with their local wine 
merchant, who often matured and bottled the wine, but it did provide in-
formation, which was relevant for establishing a national market. Because 
the decision to classify a harvest as vintage rested with the port shipper 
alone, the seHing of poor-quality wine as 'vintage' would damage his repu-
tation. As this reputation had often been built up over many decades, short-
term opportunistic behaviour was usuaHy discouraged.27 By contrast, 
sherry was a blended wine made from many different harvests, and created 
25 Sherry was produced in Jerez de la Frontera, Sanlucar, and Puerto de Santa María in che Cadiz Bay 
re'f6o~haw, Wine, p. 217. This section is based on Simpson, Too little regulation? 
27 Sellers, Oporro, gives a history of che major pon houses. 
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using the solera.28 A few vintage wines were produced, but it was generally 
believed that sherry remained fresher in casks than in bottles, and the solera 
system had the advantage of reducing considerably the time it took to 
mature the wine. The solera therefore made it easier for exporters to 
produce a standardized product and dispose of wines from the poor 
vintages, but it provided les s information for consumers. Sherry was 
frequently sold using the brand name of the shipper, and quality identified 
by numbers or marks rather than by the year. The system was often confus-
ing, as Ridley's noted in 1892: 
The public knows so much of vintages and growths of Champagnes, Ports, Clarets, 
and to a lesser extent of Burgundies and Hocks .... With Sherry the case is very dif-
ferent. And the consumer knows nothing but vague names as Vino de Pasto, Amon-
tillado, Oloroso, etc; the result is that he has less means of judging what price he 
ought to pay.29 
As a result, as Duguid has argued, it was often the local wine merchants 
who established their own brand.30 Of these, the most famous was perhaps 
Harvey's Bristol Cream, which dates from the early 1860s, althoup! the 
shipper González Byass also started selling Tio Pepe in the 1870s.3 Both 
of these were expensive wines, and unsuitable for the development of a 
mas s market. However, if the poor classification of sherries provided custo-
mers, especially new ones, with limited information on quality, the major 
factor behind the decline in sales was the concem of consumers regarding 
the potential health risks associated with the drink. 
Sherry was an expensive drink on account of the high cost of land and 
labour and the low yields, so to meet the demand for cheap white wines 
after 1860, Jerez's shippers tumed to other regions in central and south-
em Spain. To reduce costs, these wines were often exported shortly after 
the harvest, and were heavily fortified to stop them tuming sour. The suc-
cess of sherry encouraged producers in other countries to sell their own 
'sherry'. Of particular concem to the health authorities in Britain were 
the 'manufactured' wines, the most notorious perhaps being 'Hamburg 
sherry', which was made by adding spirits, saccharine, and other sub-
stances to 'a light German wine of poor quality'. 32 When the lower level 
of duty was extended from 26° to 30° proof after 1886, it was widely 
reported that chemicals were being added to stabilize cheap Spanish white 
28 The solera consists of a series ofbarrels of similar types of sherry, at different levels of development. 
When wine is withdrawn for sale from the oldest, it is refilled by wine from the next, and so on along the 
solera. If only small quantities are removed, then the new wines that have been introduced quickly 
assume the quality of the old ones. 
29 Ridley's, March 1892, p. 165. 
30 Duguid, 'Developing the brand', p. 26. 
31 For this early date of Harvey's Bristol Cream, see Simpson, Too little regulation? and for Tio Pepe, 
Montañés, González Byass. 
32 Medical Times and Gazette, quoted in Tovey, Wine revelations. 
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wines so that they could be imported at the lower dUty.33 Although this 
continual and widespread bad publicity made many in Britain believe that 
'lemons' had ruined the market for the good wines, it cannot be the only 
explanation. In particular, the cIaim made by Dr Thudichum in 1873 
regarding the supposed health risks associated with the use of gypsum when 
crushing the grapes, and sulphur in the fumigation of the casks, applied to all 
sherries, not just the cheap ones. It was widely debated in both the national 
and local press, and it was not until sorne 20 years later that the Lancet 
published a report showing that these practices were perfect1y safe.34 
The export of adulterated cheap wines from Portugal appears to have 
been les s expensive.35 Yet the demand from Britain for cheap port was just 
as great as that for cheap sherry, although 'good young port' sold for more 
than either 'common sherry' or 'sound Cadiz white wine' (figure 7). In the 
late nineteenth century, the price ofport was often made more competitive, 
especially in f.ublic houses, by mixing it with cheap Spanish red wines from 
Tarragona.3 Tarragona red sold at half the price of the cheapest port, and 
the mixing was done by retail wine merchants or publicans, most of whom 
had personal contact with consumers. Therefore the problem that those 
involved in the sherry trade failed to solve was not so much that different 
wines were being mixed and sold as sherry, but rather that their cIassi-
fication was poor, and there were rumours conceming the supposed health 
risks. Although the quantities of adulterated sherries may have been rela-
tively small, and the quality of 'good' sherry by the 1880s had perhaps 
improved significant1y from the levels of the 1860s, demand failed to 
recover. The situation may suggest that the control of product quality for 
cheaper wines was best left in the hands of retailers in the United Kingdom, 
rather than producers in Jerez or Porto. However, before considering this 
possibility, it is necessary to look first at the experience of two unfortified 
wines, namely cIaret and champagne. 
IV 
In theory at least, the Bordeaux wine trade appears to have been in a 
strong position to avoid the problems encountered by the sherry trade in 
establishing and maintaining product reputation. For quality cIaret, the 
33 Simpson, Too little regulation? By 1900, 81% of Spanish imports paid ls. a gallon (compared with 
just 8% of Portugal' s), but by this date only 37% of imports of Spanish wines were white. 
34 See Jeffs, Sherry, pp. 95-8. 
35 'The one saving feature, as compared with the trade in cheap so-called Sherry, is that shippers of 
respectable standing at Oporto have not yet condescended, like the leading Xerez and Port St. Mary 
houses, to traffic in such dangerous commodities, and as the bulk of the trade must always remain in 
their hands, the evil will not, we hope, be extended beyond its present limit'. Ridley's, Jan. 1887, p. 2. 
36 S.C. on Wine Duties (P.P. 1878-9, XIV), p. 103. By 1896 the United Kingdom was importing more 
Spanish red than white. When imports from Spain started to decline after 1900 because of problems of 
quality, Australian wines were used. 
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c1assification ofthe leading growers in 1855 provided a sufficiently accurate 
guide that has a110wed it to remain virtually unchanged to this day.37 For 
the cheaper wines, well-established export houses were able to draw on 
the produce of a much larger and highly diverse wine district covering 
almost 200,000 hectares in 1873.38 Yet exports from Bordeaux to the Uni-
ted Kingdom, both of quality bottled c1aret and of ordinary table wines, fol-
lowed a similar trend, rising rapidly from the 1860s and then dec1ining 
equally quick1y from the 1880s (figure 3). On the eve of the First World 
War the United Kingdom imported linle more wine from Bordeaux than 
it had done prior to the early 1860s. 
In 1816 André Jullien published the first c1assification of Bordeaux's lead-
ing vineyards in his Topographie de tous les vignobles connus, which listed five 
distinctive c1asses, although specific properties were found in only the first 
twO.39 Other lists soon followed, published both in French and in Eng-
lish.40 However, it was the Bordeaux Classification of 1855, compiled by 
the brokers (courtiers) for the Universal Exhibition ofthat year, that became 
the reference for the wine trade and consumers alike. This listed 61 of the 
Médoc's vineyards and one from the Graves region (Chateau Haut-Brion) 
in a five-c1ass c1assification of red wines. Its success stemmed from three 
factors. First, rather than being a subjective study based on taste, it used 
prices that had been paid for different wines over many years. Second, it 
was the relatively impartial brokers, and not the growers, who compiled 
it. Finally, wine merchants considered it as only a rough guide, and were 
quite willing to pay higher or lower prices when they thought a wine war-
ranted it. This was important, because the quality of a chateau's wine varied 
not only according to the vintage, but also over time on account of changes 
in the leve1 of investment and the quality of management ski11s.41 
However, the 1855 c1assification ignored the great majority of vineyards 
in the region. As these produced many good wines, the increasing popu-
larity of c1aret encouraged growers to establish their own brand names by 
adopting an impressive name for their vineyard. The leading wine guide 
to the region, Cocks and Feret's Bordeaux et ses vins, listed only 318 
chateaux in its 1868 edition, but the number increased to 800 in 1881, 
and to 1,600 in 1900.42 Previously obscure vineyards, which perhaps had 
37 Chateau Mouton-Rothschild was promoted to a First Growth in 1973. The 1855 classification also 
included a two-class classification of white wines. 
38 This was significantly more than it had been earlier in the century. Franck in 1824, for example, 
gives only 130,000 hectares: Trailé sur les vins, cited in Roudié, Vignobles et vignerons, p. 31. 
39 Jullien, Topographie. Sorne of the brokers (courtiers) had their own private lists in the eighteenth 
century. For a history of the classification of Bordeaux wines, see Markham, 1855. 
40 For example, in French, Franck, Traité sur les vins (1824), Le guide (1825), Paguierre, Classification 
(1829) and Cocks, Bordeaux (1850); and in English, Jullien, Topography (1824), Henderson, History 
(1824), Paguierre, Classification (1828), Redding, Modern wine (1833), and Cocks, Bordeaux (1846). 
41 Only Chateau Mouton-Rothschild and Chateau Léoville-Barton have remained with the same 
family since 1855: Robinson, ed., Oxford companion, p. 245. 
42 See Roudié, Vignobles et vignerons, p. 142. 
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produced excellent wine to sell under a shipper's name, now gained an 
identity for themse1ves. 
Having established a recognizable brand name, growers had to protect 
it. To prevent merchants from mixing their wines with others, estate bot-
tling was introduced by some producers, and with it the use of distinc-
tive labels and branded corks. British wholesale merchants criticized the 
trend towards chateau bottling, claiming that it was 'a guarantee of ori-
gin, not of quality', 43 but also realized that, as happened with cham-
pagne, its widespread use would give the producers a greater control 
of the market and a greater share of the profits at the expense of the 
merchants. 
The experiment in chateau bottling was only temporary, however, not 
because the concept was flawed, but as a result of the breakdown in the 
supply of quality wines. The appearance of downy mildew significantly 
reduced harvests in the Bordeaux region between 1882 and 1886, 
but-more importantly-ruined their quality. After the harvest of 1884, 
Chateau Lafite sold its wine for [,14 per hogshead, with 'the right to 
bottle at the Chateau with the brand and labe1,.44 Unfortunately, only 
after part of the consignment had been sold by the shipper several years 
later was it discovered that the wine had tumed bad. Following the legal 
dispute over who was responsible, together with the bad publicity 
generated, chateau bottling lost its popularity until the 1920s. 
The potential threat caused to growers by phylloxera was even greater. 
Not only would they have to replant the dead vines, but there was afear 
that the immune American root-stock used as a replacement would reduce 
the quality of the leading wines. Producers of quality wines therefore 
resorted to the heavy use of chemicals and fertilizers and the flooding of 
vineyards in a successful, but expensive, attempt to de1ay the spread of 
the disease. Therefore, while the smaller vineyards of the Gironde, whose 
owners could not afford such measures, were being devastated by 
phylloxera, the leading producers of red wine in the Médoc actually 
increased oUtput.45 Ironically, these successful attempts to delay phylloxera 
resulted in a decline in quality-precise1y what the producers had been 
attempting to avoid. Chateau Margaux's output, for example, reportedly 
increased from 450 hogsheads of 'premier wine' in the ear1y 1880s to 
between 1,200 and 1,400 hogsheads of 'indifferent' or 'bad'-quality wine 
in 1903.46 
43 Army & Navy Co-operative Society, cited in Ridley's, 12 June 1889, p. 298. 
44 Ridley's, Jan. 1887, p .. 35. 
45 Taking 1864/78 as 100, the output for the whole ofthe Gironde fell to 78 in 1888/97, but that of 
the Grand crus of the Médoc increased to 121: Lafforgue, 'Cent cinquante ans', p. 301; Pijassou, 
Le Médoc, pp. 776-7. Chíiteau Latour, for example, increased output by 252% between 1879/87 and 
1898/1907: Higounet, ed., Chateau Latour, p. 297. 
46 Ridley's, April 1903, p. 675. 
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The abundant supplies of not very good wine from the top growers 
encouraged retail merchants to exploit the brand names that had been 
created by the 1855 Classification. Thus it was argued that: 
The Public, who unfortunately know more about Growths, than Vintages, receive 
Circulars offering Chateau this or Chateau that at apparently extremeIy low rates, 
and on the strength of the name, purchase Wines, which can but prove intensely dis-
appointing. They then are apt to argue that, if wines bearing the names of the best 
estates of the Médoc be so inferior, those of Iower grade must be bad indeed. Thus 
their faith in CIaret, instead of in the merchant, who has soId it them, is shaken, and 
an inducement is at hand to try Wine from sorne other districtS.47 
Demand in Britain for quality claret fell significantly and if this was some-
times explained by the growing popularity of smoking and drinking cofIee 
instead of drinking fine claret after dinner, the absence of good vintages 
from the early 1880s and the decline in the reputation of the leading brands 
were contrlbuting factors.48 The apparent shift in market control back-
wards along the supply chain from the Bordeaux merchants (négociants) 
to the producers in the three decades following the 1855 Classification 
and the introduction of chateau bottling, was perhaps more illusionary than 
real. Virtually all wines, even those of the leading chateaux, were purchased 
by the négociants shortly after the harvest, and matured in their Bordeaux 
cellars before being shipped. However, the difficulties of the major Médoc 
growers following the mildew years of 1882/6 saw the négociants strengthen 
their position significantly. In particular, the continual financial difficulties 
of the leading growers led many of them in 1907 and 1908 to enter into 
price agreements (abonnements) for five or more harvests with individual 
shippers, selling their wine at a low, but guaranteed, price.49 Backward 
integration through the purchase of a chateau by the négociants (or their 
families) also increased in these years. 
The measurement of trade by volume disguises the real significance of 
market change, as it was the British demand for small quantities of very 
fine wines that had produced the prosperity from the 1860s to the early 
1880s. Another problem is that although French trade statistics show 
wine exported in bottles from the Gironde, unknown quantities of 
high-quality, young wines were also exported in barreIs to be bottled 
at their destination. As red wine production from the leading growers 
almost doubled in the five-year period immediately before the outbreak 
47 Ibid., 11 Sept. 1897. 
48 'English habits ... have undergone a considerable change during the past 30 years, and the after-
dinner half-hour is now monopolized by coffee and tobacco, while Britons have not yet accustomed 
themselves to serve fine claret or burgundy with roast meat or game': Letter from Gilbey to The Times, 
29 Sept. 1896. 
49 Most of the leading growers (Ch. Lafite, Latour, Margaux, Haut-Brion, Mouton-Rothschild, and 
others) were involved: Cocks and Feret, Bordeaux el ses vins, 8th edn., pp. xviii-xxü. 
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Table 2. Indicators 01 Bordeaux's quality wine production and exports 
1877/1881 1900/1904 % change 
Production 39,375 76,932 +95 
Expons 
Total expons 100,861 44,606 -56 
Ofwhich 
Britain 47,210 17,724 -62 
All other markets 53,651 26,882 -50 
Other European markets 13,486 10,230 -24 
Non-European markets 40,165 16,652 -59 
Ofwhich 
Latin America 21,478 2,695 -87 
North America 6,254 4,528 -28 
French colonies 6,229 
Dutch Indies 4,551 
British India 1,630 
Other countries 6,252 3,200 
Notes: Quantities in hectolitres. Production is red wine from the leading growers (grands crus) of the Médoc (Chateau 
Haut-Brion is excluded owing to the absence of output figures for 1877/81). Exports include all wine in bottles. 
Sources: Coclts and Feret, Bordeaux eE ses mm, 7th edn., pp. 104-5 and 8th edn., pp. 90-1; Direction Générale des 
Douanes, Tableau Général du commerce, various years. 
of mildew and the turn of the twentieth century, exports of aH bottled 
wines from Bordeaux feH by more than 50 per cent (table 2). EIsewhere 
the problems regarding reputation, together with rising tariffs, were also 
responsible for weakening demand, so that the British market in 1900/4 
remained larger than that of the rest of Europe and North America 
combined. Sales of bottled claret to Sweden feH by 86 per cent, to Ger-
many by 43 per cent, to the Netherlands by 42 per cent, to North Amer-
ica by 26 per cent, and only Belgium saw an increase, by 38 per cent.50 
However the weakness of this source is apparent from the inclusion of 
both Latin American and French colonial markets, which in general 
imported cheaper wines than those sold in Europe. Instead of being 
caused by difficulties with reputation, the decline in sales to Latin Amer-
ica can be attributed to a combination of growing national production 
and rising tariffs. 51 Tariffs were obviously not a factor in France's 
colonial markets, and by 1900/4 Senegal had established itself as the 
third largest market for bottled claret, after Britain and the United 
States.52 
50 1 include those years when no figures are given (Germany 1881, Canada 1880, 1901, and 1902, 
and Sweden, 1904), even though sorne expons are probably included in 'ail other countries' for these 
years. By excluding these years, the decline in impons is in Germany, -55%, in North America, 
-23%, and in Sweden, -82%. 
51 Salaven, Le commerce des mns, pp. 187-8. For tariffs, Cocks and Feret, Bordeaux et ses mns, 8th edn., 
pp. 1051-64. 
52 Expon to Senegal averaged 3.7 million hectolitres in 1900/4, against 17.7 million to Britain, and 
4.1 million to the United States. 
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The cause of the market loss for the cheaper Bordeaux wines was slightly 
different. Domestic wine shortages led to prices increasing in France by 
one-third from the early 1870s to the early 1880s, and the rise would have 
been even greater if it had not been for the high level of imports, and the 
'manufacture' of wines.53 In response to the smaller harvests, Bordeaux 
merchants tried to keep prices low by mixing with inferior, imported wines. 
By the mid-1880s Bordeaux was itself importing more wine than it was 
exporting, leading the British consul to note that 'it is probable that about 
50 per cent of all wines shi~ped from here last year to British ports in wood 
were "vins de cargaison" '. The British press went a step further. Accord-
ing to The Telegraph, 
An immense proportion of the Wine soId in England as CIaret has nothing to do with 
the banks of the Garonne, save that harsh heavy vintages have been brought from 
Spain and ItaIy, and dried currants from Greece, there to be manipulated and 
re-shipped to EngIand and the rest of the World as Lafite, Larose, Sto Julien, and 
Sto Estephe.55 
Although it seems unlikely that wines of the 1855 Classification actually 
suffered this fate, the frequent newspaper references to the supposed mixing 
with foreign wines or-even worse-adulteration, undermined claret's 
reputation, just as had happened earlier for sherry. Despite the fact that 
the French wine market switched from shortage to over-production in the 
early twentieth century, imports to Britain continued to fallo Once more this 
can be explained by adulteration, but this time by 'basis wines', which were 
manufactured in Britain from imported grape must and other substances, 
and then mixed with imported French wines. According to Ridley's, 'people 
drink so called "Claret", composed of one-third of the genuine article and 
two-thirds of the British imposition, and condemn, not the latter, but 
Claret,.56 
It could be argued that Bordeaux's merchants were making a necessary 
business decision when they looked elsewhere for wines because of the high 
prices and poor quality of local wine. Nevertheless, this was not how local 
growers viewed the problem, especially as many were suffering in the 1880s 
and 1890s from the heavy costs associated not only with downy mildew, but 
also with replanting their vines after phylloxera. They lobbied the govem-
ment, and in 1899 the free ports were closed, makin~ it prohibitively 
expensive to import foreign wines for blending purposes. 7 In France, the 
53 Imports increased frorn the equivalent of less than 1 % of production in the early 1870s, to one-
third in the 1880s. In 1891, dornestic production was 30 rnillion hectolitres, imports carne to 12 rnillion 
and exports to just 2 rnillion: Direction Générale, Annuaire statistique, pp. 63, 179-80. 
54 P.P., Consular report, Bordeaux, 1889, no. 501, p. 9. For trade, see Roudié, Vignobles et vignerom, 
p.180. 
55 Cited in Ridley's, July 1887, p. 315. 
56 !bid., April 1906, p. 338. 
57 French tariffs on imported wine for dornestic consumption were raised significantly in 1892, 
but no duty was paid if it was for re-exporting: Gallinato-Contino, 'Les entrepots spéciaux'; Roudié, 
Vignobles et vignerom, pp. 211-12. 
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unprecedented amount of scientific research generated by the attempts to 
combat vine diseases provided growers with the means to improve grape 
yields, which rose from 21 hectolitres per hectare in the 1860s to 33 
hectolitres in the 1900s, although at the cost of poorer quality wines.58 
As prices continued to fall during the first decade of the twentieth century, 
growers now lobbied to restrict the use of the name 'Bordeaux' to only 
those wines produced in the Gironde. The framework for the creation of 
a regional delimitation was provided by the 1905 law, although it was only 
in 1911 that boundaries were established, and only after the First World 
War that the administrative machinery was in place to enforce it. However, 
even a well-functioning regional appellation was no guarantee of quality. If 
it successfully raised prices by exc1uding poor-quality wines produced out-
side the region, this simply provided an incentive to produce more locally. 
Only with the introduction from the mid-1930s of the appellation d'origine 
controlé e, which controlled the nature of grape and wine production, could 
consumers be guaranteed at least a minimum quality standard from 
'Bordeaux' . 
Champagne was already an important drink by the eighteenth century, 
but the region's proximity to Paris had the consequence that it produced 
much greater quantities of red wine until the 1850s, when it began to face 
fierce competition from the Midi. From the late 1840s to the 1900s total 
champagne sales increased almost five times, from 7 million bottles ayear 
to 32 million.59 Grapes which had previously been used for table wines 
were switched to champagne, but technological change in wine making 
was also important in increasing output. In 1837 André Fran~ois discov-
ered how growers could measure the exact amount of sugar that needed 
to be added each year to obtain a correct fermentation. Until this date large 
quantities of wine often failed to become effervescent, or altematively the 
pressure became so great that 'an enormous proportion of bottles would 
burst' . 60 Advances in glass-making techniques allowed stronger bottles to 
be produced, reducing the loss from bottle breakage from about 25 per cent 
in the late 1850s to 10 per cent by the 1870s.61 
Most of the vineyards in the Champagne region were small, family con-
cems, and the growers sold their grapes to firms that possessed the capital 
and skills to make the wine. As a sparkling wine, champagne could only be 
sold in bottles, and it was the winemaking firms rather than those involved 
58 Calculated from Direction Générale, Annuaire statistique, pp. 62-3. The methods include the use oC 
hybrid vines, the heavy use of artificial fertilizers, and light prunings. 
59 The growth in trade was foreseen by Maiziere in 1848, when he noted that 'sparkling wines have 
made fortunes for twenty merchants, ensure an honest living for a hundred more, and provide a prompt 
and profitable outlet for the product oC every class oC grower; yet the present state of the trade, already 
ten times as lucrative as the old, is only in its infancy and can multiply tenfold within a few generations': 
cited in Faith, Story oi champagne, pp. 55,209. 
60 Simon, Champagne trade, p. 100. See also Paul, Science, vine, and wine, ch. 7. 
61 Guy, W'hen champagne became French, p. 70. 
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in retailing that were best placed to establish brand names.62 The changes 
in taste in the British market in the late 1860s to dry champagne allowed 
producers to establish 'vintage' wines similar to port, and thereby a system 
of classification which made it easier for consumers to identify the best 
wines.63 According to one authority, these changes helped to transform 
wine retailing in Britain from one of 'long credit and bad debts, limited 
business and high profits' to one of cash payrnents and higher tumover.64 
Attempts by sorne British wine merchants to have their own names placed 
on the bottles met with only limited success. Gilbey's, for example, which 
was by far the largest of the retailers, sold only producer branded cham-
pagne after 1882, although the Victoria Wine Company's list of 1896 con-
tinued to include seven 'house' champagnes, as well as 23 producer 
branded champagnes.65 Despite the opposition from the domestic wine 
trade, there were merits to the producer brands, which even Ridley's, the 
mouthpiece ofthe wholesale trade, recognized: 'the system ofbrands, what-
ever its faults may be, is supposed to act as a guarantee to the public, who 
are content to paya higher figure for a branded article, rather than incur the 
risk of not obtaining it genuine if they dispense with the guarantee'. 66 
The champagne producers were therefore the most successful in estab-
lishing brand names, so much so that one writer noted in 1890 that 'within 
ten years we will no longer recognise the name of champagne, but only 
those of Roederer, Planckaert, Bollinger, without any idea what the wines 
will be made out of'. 67 If the commercial strength of these brands was so 
strong, why did exports to Britain start to decline from around 1900? No 
doubt the decline was partly caused by the combination of higher duties 
for champagne after 1888, and rising prices because of supply shortages 
caused by phylloxera. André Simon, writing in 1905, also suggests that 
the nove1ty of drinking 'vintage' champagne had declined, as houses were 
declaring a harvest to be 'vintage' more frequently 'than in the past'. 68 
However it also seems like1y that the decline in the sales of the best cham-
pagne was in part a result of commercial strategy, as producers recognized 
that their leading wines could not attract a mass market if they were being 
branded as a luxury producto Sales strategies were changed so that produ-
cers gained a larger share of the profits, and sorne began to charge hotels 
and restaurants ifthey wanted to stock their particular brand. It was a strat-
egy which implied lower volumes, and made producers much more vulner-
able to changes in fashion, such as the growth in whisky drinking at the tum 
of the century. 
62 Once it leaves the Maison, champagne does not improve in the bottle. 
63 Simon, Champagne trade, pp. 99, 137. This author notes that the taste for sweet champagne lasted 
longer outside London. For example, the shipper George Goulet exported sweet champagne with 16% 
liquor content to a merchant in Birtningham, but with only 2% to London. 
64 Simon, Champagne trade, p. 137. 
65 Faith, Story oi champagne, p. 73; Briggs, Wine ior sale, p. 83. 
66 Ridley's, Jan. 1884, p. 3. 
67 Lamarre, cited in Faith, Story oi champagne, p. 78. 
68 Simon, Champagne trade, p. 147. 
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Yet the leading champagne brands probably accounted for only a rela-
tively small part ofthe British market in terms ofvolume. The rapid growth 
everywhere in the demand for champagne, the limited area of suitable land, 
and the appearance of phylloxera after 1890, led to an increase in the sales 
of poor-quality wines. Fraud, which had been 'a peripheral concem in the 
1890s', became 'the central issue for producers of both ordinary and fine 
wines at the tum of the century'. 69 Champagne producers had been more 
successful than other wine producers in defending their wines, and in 
1889 they succeeded in getting a judgement that forbade producers from 
other regions to use the words 'champagne' or 'vins de champagne' in 
France. Implementation was more difficult, however. Furthermore, the 
judgement failed to stop Champagne's own producers buying wines from 
other regions, mixing them with local wines, and then selling them as 
'champagne', a practice which was es~ecially widespread after the disas-
trous harvests between 1908 and 1910. o Consumers could still fmd quality 
champagne, but the demand for the cheaper brands dec1ined rapidly in Brit-
ain after 1900. Growers once more looked to create a regulatory authority, 
establishing a regional appellation in 1911 by restricting the production of 
champagne to grapes produced in a number of c1early defined areas. 
v 
In terms of value, approximately 60 per cent of all food and drink con-
sumed in Britain was imported by 1914.71 This dependence on imports, 
together with the rapid growth in population, especially in urban areas, 
and the increase in real disposable incomes, encouraged new forms of mar-
ket organization, sometimes called the 'retailing revolution'. Among these 
changes were the increasing importance of brand names, advertising, and 
the appearance of large multiple retail outlets. In particular, the growing 
dependence of British consumers on world markets helped to change the 
location of power along the commodity chain. For example, the import 
of frozen meat reduced the need for skilled butchers but required guaran-
teed outlets for the 'vast quantities of frozen and later chilled meat that were 
pouring into the U nited Kingdom'. 72 By 1910, a total of only 10 UK firms 
had between them established a total of 3,684 branches,73 and it was these 
69 Guy, When champagne becameFrench, p. 119. However, Toveynoted in 1870 that 'even atEpemay 
and other places in Champagne it is well known that there are houses which use but linle of the wine of 
the district in the manufacture of their wines': Tovey, Champagne, p. 19. 
70 Although The Times reminded consumers of the large reserves of quality wines in the region, and 
also of the good reputation of the leading brands, it also noted that the champagne vintage of 1908 'had 
been the subject of so many irresponsible statements and misleading comments and conclusions in the 
press': The Times, 19 Nov. 1908, p. 9. See also Daily Telegraph, 28 Aug. and 3 Sep. 1903, cited in Guy, 
When champagne became French, p. 124. 
71 Tumer, 'Agricultural output', pp. 224-5. 
72 Jefferys, Retail tradingin Britain, p. 190. Impotts ofmeat increased from 10% ofthe total in 1870 to 
37% in 1896: ibid., p. 182. 
73 Ibid., p. 187. 
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firms that controlled product quality, established brands, and enjoyed scale 
economies in marketing. Likewise with coffee, the growing economies of 
scale in roasting and packaging (the latter especially after vacuum sealing 
was invented in 1900) encouraged a concentration in the number of firms 
in the consuming countries, where a growing share of the value was 
added. 74 Because demand conditions were more volatile than supply, the 
commodity chain was market- rather than producer-Ied, and brands were 
established in the importing rather than the exporting countries.75 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, like many other traders, the 
British wine merchant was skilled,76 having to be able to select suitable 
wines, blend them to the tastes of a particular consumer, and stop them 
from spoiling. Bottling was another skilled task, often undertaken on the cli-
ent's premises. Retail wine merchants in general responded to the wants 
and needs ofhigh-income consumers.77 Lower duties and the 'Single Bottle 
Act' of 1861 provided retailers with opportunities to package and market 
wines in new ways. The Victoria Wine Company, which was established 
in 1865 in Mark Lane in the City of London, had by 1886 sorne 98 stores 
throughout the country. 78 The company bottled its own wines, and placed 
the fact that they were 'unadulterated' prominently in its advertisements.79 
Gilbey's was even more successful, being responsible in 1875 for 5 per cent 
of all wine sold, six times the share of its nearest rival. 80 Taking advantage 
of the lower duties and especially the 'Single Bottle Act', it sold all its wine 
in sealed and labelled bottles.81 The firm's success was achieved by import-
ing wines in bulk directly from the country of origin, and by the use of its 
'Castle' brand and of sorne 2,000 carefully monitored agents throughout 
the country. These agents were often already well-established grocers, 
and were stocked with a selection from Gilbey's 200 different varieties 
of drinks. Sales on this scale allowed the company to spend heavily on 
advertising. 
Yet the impressive results of these two companies were insufficient to hah 
the decline in wine sales from the mid-1870s. A number ofproblems can be 
identified. First, and according to Jefferys, large-scale retailers had few 
advantages over smaller ones unless they could achieve buyinr and selling 
economies, and introduce standardization and stock control. 8 There were 
few economies of scale in wine production, and therefore higher sales did 
74 Over three-quarters of the retail price of coffee in the grocery trade was added in consurning coun-
tries by 1935: Topik, 'Integration', p. 60. 
75 See especially Casson, Infonnation and organization, pp. 28-9. 
76 Jefferys, Retail trading in Britain, p. 2. 
77 There was, of course, a market for poorer quality wines and the adulteration ofwines prior ro 1860 
was also important: see especially Redding, Modern wine. 
78 Briggs, Wine for sale, p. 9. 
79 Illustrated London News, 13 Dec. 1873, cited in Briggs, Wine for sale, p. 48. By 1880 the company 
was listing 16 sherries, together with 14 ports, 8 clarets, and 'sundry wines' including a Hambro sherry 
(ibid., p. 53). 
80 Faith, Victorian vineyard, p. 12. 
81 S.C. on Wine Duties (P.P. 1878-9, XIV), p. 157. 
82 J efferys, Retail trading in Britain. 
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not lead to lower unit production coStS.83 The fact that wine quality var-
ied greatly not just from one harvest to the next, but even on an individ-
ual vineyard in the same year, led to supply instability and high 
information costs for importers. Gilbey's, for example, depended on 
leading shippers in Jerez and Porto to select its wines, although these 
were sold under Gilbey's own brand. When the firm purchased Chateau 
Loudenne in the Médoc in 1875, it was an example of backward inte-
gration which appears to have been made as much to reduce information 
costs in its search to buy suitable wines from local growers, as to cut 
production costS.84 As an investment, the purchase of Chateau Loud-
enne occurred at perhaps the worst moment possible and was a drain 
on company resources, but it did allow Gilbey's to market itself as a 
wine producer. Another problem was that although the infrastructure 
provided by the firm's shops reduced the skills that the traditional wine 
merchant required, in particular the blending of different wine, sorne 
specialized knowledge was still needed and a common complaint was 
that wines were badly stored by grocers. 
Although Gladstone had hoped that the legislation of the early 1860s 
would extend wine drinking to other social classes, the evidence suggests 
that it had only limited success.85 In the early 1880s, a very rough estimate 
by the British Association claimed that the working class purchased 75 per 
cent of all beer and spirits, but consumed just 10 per cent of wine. Taking 
annual per caput consumption at this time as two and a half bottles, this 
implies that 75 per cent of the population on average drank only one-third 
of a bottle, and the remainder consumed nine bottles.86 For the years 1913-
14, another survey shows that those with annual incomes of between [,150 
and [,200 consumed four times more wine than those with between [,50 
and [,100.87 Therefore, given that the middle- and upper-class consumers 
appear to have continued to account for an important segment of the mar-
ket, it is possible that demand factors specific to these social groups were at 
least partly responsible for the fact that per caput consumption of wine 
declined more than that of either spirits or beer in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Traditionally, considerable amounts of port, sherry, and claret had 
been drunk in rural areas, and contemporaries noted in particular the 
decline in demand with the onset of the agrarian crisis and the fall in rents 
after 1873. However, although sherry imports actually peaked in that year, 
83 For potential scale economies in grape and wine production, see Simpson, 'Cooperation and 
cooperatives' . 
84 Gilbey's first bought wines directly in France in 1863: Maxwell, Half-a-century, p. 18. For Chateau 
Loudenne, see especially, Faith, Vicrorian vineyard. 
85 Gladstone's interest in reducing wine duties appears to have derived from the belief that free trade 
and sobriety went hand in hand: Harrison, Drink and the Vicrorians, p. 248. Not only did he expect wine 
consumption and revenue to rise rapidly after the reduction in duties, but he also hoped to change the 
social habits oC drinkers. 
86 The 'working c1ass' is taken as 75%. Quoted in Rowntree and Sherwell, Temperance problem, p. 10, 
my calculation. 
87 Colwyn Report (p.P. 1927, XI), p. 92, cited in Sumen, Liquidpleasure, p. 142. 
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there were other factors present which help to provide an explanation.88 
Port imports were also weak during the 1880s, but then recovered. Dec1in-
ing farm incomes probably reduced demand from this group of consumers, 
but new potential markets were appearing in the rapidly growing urban cen-
tres. For example, rural consumers had traditionally purchased their port 
and sherry in barreIs, and bottled them on their own premises, but urban 
consumers in general often had limited sEace for a wine cellar, and pre-
ferred to buy their wines already bottled. 9 Likewise it was argued at the 
tum of the century that brewers were entering into the wine trade, not just 
supplying their publicans, but also purchasing wine merchants' busi-
nesses.90 In other words, changes in real incomes and inequality he1ped 
to alter the shape of demand, and this was just as likely to be beneficial 
for the consumption of sorne types of wines as prejudicial for others. In 
particular, it do es not explain why urban consumers did not drink more, 
or why multiple retail outlets were not as successful in marketing wine as 
they were in marketing other foods and beverages. 
VI 
This artic1e has tried to explain why the growth of the British wine market 
which took place after the changes in duties and retailing laws in the early 
1860s was limited. Imports grew quick1y until the mid-1870s, but then 
feH, and per caput consumption was no greater in 1913 than it had been 
in 1815, despite the retail price of the cheapest wines being one-fifth of 
those in Wellington's time. Why were markets which had been gained 
after 1860 subsequently lost? This artic1e has argued that producers and 
shippers had limited success in c1assifying and guaranteeing the quality 
of their wines for a changing market. In Jerez the solera system was an ad-
mirable method of blending wines and maintaining quality, but provided 
consumers with too little information about the nature of the wine, es-
pecially in a period when widespread adulteration was taking place. By 
contrast, the 1855 Bordeaux Classification provided good information 
on the re1ative merits of the leading c1aret producers, but the crucial infor-
mation on the vintage was missing. When vine diseases ruined wine qual-
ity in the 1880s, large quantities of 'villainous trash' were exported, and 
wines were often marketed by emphasizing their 'growth', rather than 
the 'vintage'. With both sherry and c1aret it seems that, as Akerlof 
predicted, the presence of poor-quality wines had a negative impact on 
the market for better ones. In the case of sherry and cheap c1arets, the 
drop in quality was caused by poorer wines from other regions or 
88 Sherry impons peaked in 1873, in pan because ofthe rumours that duties were to be raised: Pan-
Montojo, La Bodega del Mundo, p. 106. Thudichum's infamous lener to The Times was published in the 
same year. 
89 Ridley's, April 1903, p. 241, Sept. 1904, p. 639, and Sept. 1899, p. 621. 
90 See, for example, Ridley's, Sept. 1899, p. 622 and Jan. 1900, p. 8. 
© Economic History Saciety 2004 24
104 JAMES SIMPSON 
'manufactured wines' being wrongly labelled, but with quality c1aret it was 
the consequence of a run of exceptionally poor harvests. In this case, large 
quantities of poor-quality wines from the leading producers were 
exported, ruining their reputation, with the result that although they were 
producing more wine than at any time during the period under dis-
cussion, the value of their properties was at its lowest.9 By contrast, both 
champagne and port producers were more successful in protecting their 
brands than c1aret producers. Consumers could c1assify the relative status 
of a champagne or port by the reputation of the producer/shipper and the 
quality of the vintage. More important perhaps, there were c1ear1y defined 
uses for both these wines after the poorer harvests, and these uses did not 
have a detrimental impact on the quality market. Port shippers were less 
likely than sherry shippers to ship poor-quality wines, and the leading 
champagne shippers were the most successful of all, both in creating 
brands and in protecting their regional identity. 
Given the difficulties in establishing objective measures of quality for con-
sumers, the incentive for shippers, especially those who did not have to 
maintain a reputation for quality wines, was to export large quantities of 
cheap wines. Ridley's naturally argued that a more efficient guarantee of 
quality for consumers was provided by the reputation of British wine mer-
chants. As with an increasing number of other foods and beverages by the 
late nineteenth century, this implies that commodity chains would be 'mar-
ket' - rather than 'production' -led, and importers would be responsible for 
c1assifying and controlling wine quality. They could avoid a poor vintage 
in a particular region, but make large purchases after good vintages. In 
other words they could perform, on a larger geographical scale and in the 
United Kingdom, the sort of operations for which the Bordeaux négociant 
had traditionally been responsible. This was partly why Gilbey's was 
initially successful. However, the scale required in co-ordinating purchases 
from different centres of wine production was considerable, and to deve10p 
a brand name as successful as Gilbey's required a considerable capital outlay. 
In fact, Gilbey's was probably unique in Europe at this time, and the Brit-
ish wine market differed significantly from that of other countries in many 
ways. Virtually all quality sherry and port was sold to this market and, 
despite the problems discussed in this artic1e, the British market remained 
the largest for bottled c1aret in the ear1y twentieth century.92 Only with 
champagne did other markets of any size existo However, although compar-
isons with other countries regarding quality wine have only limited value, 
their experience with ordinary wines is relevant. It is difficult to establish 
long-run price series because of the question of quality, yet the presence 
of vine diseases, especially from the late 1870s and 1880s, drove prices 
sharply up throughout Europe. The production of artificial wines and the 
practice of adulteration was at least as widespread in producer countries 
91 For real estate prices, see Pijassou, Le Médoc, and Caziot, Le valeur de la terreo 
92 Britain accounted for about one-fifth of Bordeaux's exports in bortIes in 1909/11. 
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as in Britain.93 Per caput wine consumption also declined in France from 
the 1870s, from an average of 145 litres per person in 1869-78 to 98 litres 
in 1883-92. The fact that wine in France and Spain was the alcoholic bev-
erage of first choice implies that the combination of high prices and adulter-
ation caused only a temporary decline in consumption. The recovery in 
supplies from the 1890s brought about a revival of wine drinking, and by 
the 1900s annual consumption had reached over 150 litres per person in 
France. In Britain, by contrast, the market for cheap wines was still very 
limited when it peaked in the early 1870s, and in the face of higher prices 
and falling quality, consumers tumed to other alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
drinks. Therefore although per caput beer consumption also declined 
slightly in the late nineteenth century, not only was beer cheaper than wine, 
it was also probably purer.94 No doubt many of the claims conceming the 
adulteration of Spanish 'white' and Bordeaux 'red' were exaggerated, but 
there was little or no attempt from Jerez or Bordeaux to respond to the 
charges. 
This brings us to a final point, namely the contribution of wine exports to 
productivity changes in agriculture and, more generally, to economic devel-
opment. The vine was traditionally grown over large areas of Europe, with 
the high labour inputs and skills required making it an ideal crop for smaIl 
family farms. With the coming of the railways and the integration of 
national commodity markets in the mid-nineteenth centu~ there was an in-
crease in regional specialization even before phyIloxera. 9 New high-yield-
ing hybrids allowed growers to increase output, and by the tum of the 
century there was over-production in France. The high prices of ordinary 
wines in the 1870s and 1880s also encouraged an expansion ofviticulture, 
not just in the French colony of Algeria but also in countries such as Argen-
tina or Australia which had previously been dependent on Europe for 
imports. Unfortunately for European producers, by the first decade of the 
twentieth century Httle more than 10 per cent of wine produced was traded 
intemationally and European countries themselves imported approximately 
80 per cent of the total. In particular, France was responsible for half the 
world's imports in 1909/13, and the figure increased over the next couple 
of decades to reach 80 per cent by 1934/8.96 There were two reasons why 
producers found it so difficult to establish new overseas markets. The first 
93 In Spain in the late 1880s it was estirnated that about one-quarter of the wines were rnanufactured 
using foreign alcohol as a base: see Sirnpson, Spanish agriculture, p. 97. 
94 Gourvish and Wilson, British brewing industry, p. 208, suggests that 'dilution and adulteration, the 
old resort of distressed publicans, seern to have been increasingly starnped out after the rnid-1880s, as 
analysis becarne cornrnon, and brewers fought long and hard ro rernove the practice of the "long pull" .' 
Beer prices rernained stable in the second half of the nineteenth century at between 3.5d. and 6d. a 
quart: ibid., p. 207. 
95 For exarnple, France's south west and south east increased their share of the national wine rnarket 
frorn 42% in 1803/41 to 42% in 1852, and to 65% in 1900/9: Lachiver, Vins, vignes et vignerons, 
pp. 617-18. 
96 Calculated frorn Pinilla and Ayuda, 'Political econorny', tab. 2. A large proportion ofthe wine carne 
frorn Algeria to be rnixed with the wines of the Midi, and then sold in the cities of northern France. 
© Economic History Sociecy 2004 26
106 JAMES SIMPSON 
was that imports attracted relatively high levels of duty, with the consequence 
that the movements of wines between countries were strongly influenced by 
changes in the prevailing leve! of duties.97 The second factor is the subject 
of this article, namely the question of quality. In producer countries such 
as France, the better table wines enjoyed only a modest premium, and 
the incentives for the vast majority of producers therefore were to maximize 
oUtput.98 
In the half century prior to 1914, the failure of producer-Ied commodity 
chains to establish both a reputation for purity and an efficient system for 
consumers to measure quality, led to the decline in reputation of wines in 
the British market. The interwar period in general was not a good time 
for quality wines, and the British market, in particular, was depressed. 
For table wines, the return to a policy of Imperial Preference for the 
Dominion wines in 1919, which had been abolished in 1860, helped to 
reduce imports from France to less than 20 per cent of the total, or just 
40 per cent ofthe figure reached when imports peaked in 1876. Only from 
the 1950s, when the controlled appellations began to guarantee minimum 
quality, tourists started to visit mainland Europe in significant numbers, 
and supermarkets stocked wines in large quantities, did the British learn 
to enjoy Europe's wines once more. 
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